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MOLLIE GERVER
ABSTRACT There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result,
many states are permitted to accept only some refugees and not others. This raises the question
of how states should select these refugees. I defend the claim that states should resettle the
worst-off refugees, and maximize the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life.
When resettling the worst off conflicts with maximising the number gaining a sufficiently
decent life, states should select refugees to maximise aggregate benefits, with benefits holding
greater weight the further refugees are from a sufficiency threshold. The only exception to this
rule is when it entails wrongful discrimination, in which case states should only follow this rule
if victims of discrimination benefit and consent to its implementation.
Introduction
States are sometimes permitted to grant asylum to some refugees and not others. Sec-
tion 2 defends this claim. Section 3 considers how states ought to select the refugees
to which they grant asylum. I reject the claim that states ought to select those fleeing
persecution before others. For example, it would be wrong for states to always select
those fleeing ethnic-based persecution before selecting those fleeing famines, wars, and
pandemics. I instead claim that states ought to select refugees in a manner that helps
the worst-off refugees and in a manner that maximises the number of refugees obtain-
ing a sufficiently decent life. When helping the worst off conflicts with the goal of
maximising the number obtaining a decent life, states ought to select refugees consis-
tent with a principle of priority. Under this principle, states would select refugees to
maximise aggregate benefits, with benefits holding greater weight the worse-off refu-
gees are. In Section 4, I argue that such selections may entail wrongful discrimination.
This is because sometimes discriminating against certain groups – such as those with
particular disabilities – can increase the available resources states have in accepting
refugees, leading to more refugees accepted and worse-off refugees accepted. Such dis-
crimination is wrong, but may nonetheless be all things considered permissible if (a)
victims of this discrimination benefit compared to nondiscriminatory selection meth-
ods and (b) victims of this discrimination consent to such discrimination as a result.
When Can States Permissibly Select Refugees?
I assume that states have a limit in the costs they are morally required to bear in
accepting refugees. For example, ‘Billionstan’ might have a $1 billion budget set aside
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for providing asylum to refugees, and this budget may be all it has a duty to bear in
accepting refugees. If Billionstan could not accept all refugees with this $1 billion bud-
get, then it would need to consider how it selected the refugees it accepted within this
budget. It does not necessarily have a duty to accept as many refugees as possible
within this budget. This is because some methods of selecting refugees may be morally
optimal even if they do not maximise the number obtaining asylum. This will be made
clearer throughout.
Though I assume states have a duty to bear certain costs, I am neutral as to how
much and what these costs are. It may be that states have a duty to accept financial
costs that are moderate, but not above some threshold.1 Or perhaps states have a duty
to accept as high costs as possible until accepting more refugees endangers citizens’
access to basic rights.2 States may even be permitted to avoid certain cultural costs;
perhaps if a very large number of refugees arriving would undermine the state’s cul-
ture, the state would not have a duty to accept them all, raising the question of who it
must accept.
Importantly, there may be imaginary costs, in that the majority of policymakers and
voters falsely believe they are permitted to invest no more than a given cost or falsely
believe that costs are higher than they are. For example, policymakers and voters
might only stand for accepting 30,000 refugees because they falsely believe the costs of
accepting more than 30,000 are higher than they are, perhaps falsely believing refugees
are a drain on the economy. Or they may be aware of the actual costs but falsely think
they have no duty to bear them, perhaps because of xenophobia or racism. When this
occurs, there will sometimes be a particular agent tasked with selecting the refugees
given asylum, and this agent may be unable to persuade the government to accept
more than below-obligatory costs in accepting refugees. This agent should at least
select refugees in a way that meets the state’s imagined responsibilities, and the same
question arises as to which refugees this agent ought to select.
For example, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) protection officers in unsafe transit
countries are often tasked with recommending refugees for resettlement to safe host
states and are unable to persuade host states to invest more costs in accepting refu-
gees, consistent with these states’ real duties. Though such UNHCR officers are pow-
erless to increase costs states will accept, they have power in selecting who is
ultimately granted asylum within these lower-than-obligatory costs.
For both policymakers and UNHCR officers, then, there is a question of how they
ought to select the refugees to which they grant asylum.
How to Select Refugees
There are five potential selection methods. The final is the most justified.
Persecution and Violence
Some claim that states are only obligated to grant asylum to those fleeing persecution
or general violence. Though states must protect others suffering from grave harm,
such as those suffering from malnutrition in low-income countries, they can protect
such individuals by sending them aid. In contrast, states cannot save those fleeing
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persecution and general violence by sending aid alone. Only providing them asylum
will be effective, and so those fleeing persecution and violence have a right to asylum
which others do not have.3 This rule is not precise: sometimes a state can only save
individuals suffering from poverty by granting asylum because their home governments
are blocking international aid.4 But if a state can save individuals through aid, it has
no duty to provide asylum.
There is a problem with the above argument. Even if states have no duty to accept
individuals whom they assist abroad, they may still have a duty to accept individuals
who they can but do not assist abroad. If states can send aid and don’t – and there is
evidence they don’t5 – many living in poverty can only save themselves through asy-
lum. If individuals can only save themselves through asylum, it seems such individuals
have equal rights to asylum as those fleeing persecution and general violence.6
Importantly, even if states do send as much aid as they have a duty to send, states
may still have duties to provide asylum to others who have not obtained this aid. For
example, if a state fulfils its duties by giving £1 million in aid, saving 50,000 individu-
als abroad, it might still have a duty to accept additional individuals above these
50,000 if this incurs no extra costs. This would incur no extra costs when refugees
pay taxes greater in value than the services they receive. If a state incurs no costs in
accepting these refugees, it cannot claim it has no duty to provide them asylum based
on earlier assistance alone.
Of course, the initial costs of integrating refugees may be high, even if these costs
are offset through taxes at a later time, and there may be nonfinancial costs, such as
the culture of a country suddenly changing. Even if providing refugees asylum does
entail short-term or cultural costs, states may still have a duty to accept some refugees
who have already arrived at the state’s borders.
This is because of the Proximity Claim: when an agent has sacrificed resources to
help those far away, she retains a duty to invest some costs in rescuing those close
by, assuming the costs fall below a given threshold.7 For example, if Beatrice has
already given £20,000 to charity, no longer holding an obligation to give more, she
might still have an obligation to bring an injured person to the hospital if coming
across him on the side of the road. This seems true even if this will cost her £5 in
petrol and conflict with a cultural activity scheduled that day.8 Given her close prox-
imity to the injured man, the costs for her seem sufficiently low to create a duty
despite her previous donations.
If the Proximity Claim is true, then states already fulfilling their duty to assist via
aid could maintain a duty to rescue refugees at the banks of their shores or the termi-
nals of their airports. A question then arises of which refugees states should accept,
assuming they needn’t accept all. Given that states could accept many who are partic-
ularly badly off, and who can only improve their conditions via asylum, there is no
reason to suppose states should prioritise those fleeing violence and persecution com-
pared to others.
Selecting the Worst Off
If many individuals are particularly badly off and can only improve their conditions
by migrating, perhaps refugees are all individuals who are particularly badly off and
can only improve their conditions by migrating. If this is true, it seems that states
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selecting between such individuals ought to prioritise those more badly off over
those less badly off.
There is more than one way someone might be more badly off than someone else.
X could be more badly off than Y if X is (a) less able than Y to access certain basic
rights or (b) is deprived of important rights which Y is able to access. An individual
suffering from untreated AIDS and persecution ought to be selected before someone
who is healthy and suffering from the same persecution. Similarly, when two individu-
als are suffering from the same rights violations, the individual suffering from a more
severe form of the rights violation could be selected first, given that this individual is
plausibly worse off than the other. For example, an individual unable to leave a small
detention cell perhaps has priority in obtaining asylum over an individual unable to
leave her village.
There are, however, some drawbacks to relying on rights alone. One drawback is
that there will likely be disagreement over how we rank basic rights. This is a problem
when two individuals are suffering from the same number of basic rights violations.
For example, it is not clear if the right to basic freedom is more important than the
right to life. Moreover, there are often multiple individuals who will suffer similar
rights violations to the same degree.
When this occurs, we could establish who is worse off by appealing to predictions
of subjective wellbeing, rather than objective rights. More specifically, we might
compare refugees in terms of their predicted Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
without asylum.
To see how this is done, it is useful to momentarily put the discussion of refugees
aside to discuss health care. Health-care providers often use QALYs in deciding how
to distribute health-care funds. They do so by first asking a random sample of individ-
uals with particular conditions to rank their quality of life between 1 to 10 and then
using the average to establish quality of life in a given year. For example, if the average
quality of life amongst a random sample of individuals with untreated AIDS is
reported as 5 out of 10, it is assumed that the quality of life of an individual living
with untreated AIDS is only half that of an individual with full health. A year with
AIDS is therefore equal to 1(.5) = .5 QALYs.9 Once health-care providers establish
the number of QALYs found in the year of an average person with a given condition,
they can use this information to allocate resources. Traditionally, state health-care pro-
viders have allocated resources to maximise QALYs, but QALYs can also be used to
prioritise the worst off: if an individual is expected to have only 20 QALYs left in their
lives – perhaps 10 years living with AIDS – they could be treated before someone with
an expected 40 QALYs left in their lives.
States could use QALYs to measure who is worse off in granting asylum, prioritising
refugees who can expect fewer QALYs without asylum before those who can expect
more QALYs if they remain without asylum. To apply this approach, states must first
consider what impacts refugees’ quality of life, asking a random sample of refugees
without asylum what their quality of life is. For example, a random sample of refugees
would include single parents and nonsingle parents, and the former might report a
lower quality of life than the latter. Importantly, certain attributes might intersect to
create fewer QALYs: single parents who are from a given ethnic group might have a
lower quality of life compared to nonsingle parents from this ethnic group and com-
pared to single parents from outside this ethnic group. Once the average quality of life
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of various cohorts within the sample is established, states and UNHCR could use this
information to make predictions about the quality of life of various cohorts (including
those outside the representative sample). If it turned out that QALYs were predicted
to be lowest for single parents from a given ethnic group, they could be prioritised
over nonsingle parents from this ethnic group and over single parents from outside
this ethnic group.
If the above method were adopted, it would need to account for certain ethical and
practical risks. Ethically, it might be offensive for a powerful and privileged aid worker
or official to ask a refugee what their quality of life is. Unlike medical practitioners
who one day will themselves grow old and face medical complications, aid workers
and government officials would be asking refugees to rate a life which aid workers and
government officials will never experience themselves. As a result, this might further
alienate refugees. One way to mitigate this worry, though perhaps not overcome it
completely, is to pay refugees to conduct these surveys themselves.
There is also a practical concern that must be addressed: refugees have an incentive
to lie, claiming their quality of life is lower than it is, to increase their chances of gain-
ing asylum.10 This practical concern can be mitigated with a sufficiently large sample
of individuals, such that each individual in the sample would have an infinitesimal
chance of benefiting from exaggerating how badly off they are. For example, a single
parent from the Bari tribe in South Sudan is likely to have only a small effect on the
final QALY predictions for all single parents from the Bari tribe if she is just one indi-
vidual in a sample of tens of thousands of subjects. Assuming she has some desire to
be honest, the very low benefit of dishonesty could mean her answers are accurate pre-
dictions of her quality of life.
Moreover, even if individuals were biased, the survey could still be used if the bias
was likely evenly distributed. For example, if single parents indicate an average quality
of life of 2 out of 10 with bias, and nonsingle parents indicate a quality of life of 3 out
of 10 with bias, and the unbiased response is 3 out of 10 for single parents and 4 out
of 10 for nonsingle parents, the survey would still distinguish between a cohort that is
better off and worse off.
If surveys do turn out to be unethical or unhelpful, then QALYs could be limited to
health-related outcomes, drawing upon existing measures. For example, if existing
medical studies from a given country find that the average quality of life living with
untreated AIDS is .5, and the average quality of life with mostly full health is .9, a
refugee in this country who will live another five years with untreated AIDS would be
prioritised over a refugee predicted to live a similar number of years with mostly full
health.11 While limiting QALY measurements to medical variables will not capture all
elements impacting quality of life, it would at least capture some elements, to be sup-
plemented with considerations of rights: a refugee suffering from AIDS and a lack of
rights to mobility would be prioritised over a refugee with AIDS and mobility and a
refugee without AIDS or mobility.12
Maximising the Number Gaining a Sufficient Life
While the above selection method captures the value of helping those most badly off,
it does not capture the value of maximising the number of individuals no longer badly
off. In other words, there is value in ensuring that as many people as possible gain a
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sufficiently decent life in terms of subjective welfare, rights protection, or some other
currency.13 If there is such a value, this leads to a dilemma: it is not clear what to do
when there is a conflict between selecting the worst-off refugees and maximising the
number obtaining asylum.
For example, consider a recent case involving 6-year-old Syrian refugee Jamal, living
in Jordon and diagnosed with Ewing Sarcoma. He arguably had a right to treatment,
but he could not access treatment in the Jordanian refugee camp. He met a New
York-based lawyer who helped him apply for resettlement in the United States to
obtain life-saving treatment.14 The cost of such treatment was likely around $100,000,
money that could have resettled at least two healthy refugees instead.15 Though Jamal
was likely one of the most at-risk refugees, resettling him meant fewer individuals
could gain a sufficiently decent life. It is not clear whether he or two other refugees
ought to have been selected.
Importantly, sometimes helping the worst-off refugees alters imagined costs, leading
to fewer obtaining a sufficiently decent life. For example, New Zealand’s annual reset-
tlement quota is 750 refugees,16 and refugees selected are rarely the worst off.17 It is
likely New Zealand has a duty to accept those worse off, but voters may disagree,
thinking accepting worse-off refugees would mean New Zealand would be unable to
accept even these 750 refugees. If civil servants selecting refugees selected the worst
off, ignoring voters’ beliefs, voters might support fewer than 750 refugees given asy-
lum. If this was the case, it is not clear if civil servants ought to accept the worse off
for resettlement or a greater number of better-off refugees.
Selecting those most badly off can also come at the expense of maximising the num-
ber obtaining a decent life when those unlikely to be saved through resettlement are
selected. For example, imagine that Jamal would have a 30% chance of survival by the
time he reached the United States. Compare him to a 4-year-old girl living in Benis-
hangul-Gumuz in Ethiopia, where the under-five mortality rate is 169 deaths per
1,000 live births.18 We might think there is value in granting her asylum, and this
value is not captured by prioritising Jamal. Though she is not as badly off, both can
only obtain a sufficiently decent life through asylum, and Jamal’s chances of gaining
such a life are lower.
Why We Should Not Use Aggregate Benefits as a Tie-breaker
Here is one tempting way of deciding between helping the worst off and maximising
the number gaining a sufficiently decent life. States could appeal to aggregate benefits,
using either QALYs, rights, or some other relevant metric.
For example, imagine two refugees would gain 56 QALYs with asylum between
them at a combined cost of $100,000, while Jamal would gain 95 QALYs for the same
$100,000. In this case, if we are choosing between Jamal (thus helping the worst off),
or the two other refugees (thus maximising the number gaining a sufficiently decent
life), it would be better from the perspective of QALY-maximisation to resettle Jamal.
Similarly, imagine that Jamal would gain three basic rights for the remainder of his life
if given asylum, which is predicted to continue for another 60 years – perhaps he
would gain the right to mobility, health care, and sufficient food for 60 more years –
while two other refugees would each gain only one right for the remainder of their
lives, predicted to be for another 30 years each. Jamal would gain the same number of
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years while gaining more rights and so should be prioritised before the two other
refugees.
A reason it is tempting to adopt the above policy is that aggregate benefits have
independent value. We tend to think it is better if there is more total subjective welfare
than less, and more rights protected than fewer. For example, it is better to create a
world of greater equality with more welfare and rights compared to a world of greater
equality with less welfare and rights. Similarly, it is better to help the worse off in a
way that ensures more welfare and rights rather than fewer; and better to ensure that
all have a sufficiently decent life in a manner that ensures more welfare and rights
rather than fewer. If there is value in aggregate welfare and rights, and we are faced
with a choice between helping the worst off and increasing the number gaining a suffi-
ciently decent life, it makes sense to appeal to this aggregate benefit.
But there is a problem with appealing to aggregate benefits as a tie-breaker. It
entails sometimes helping individuals who are much better off at the expense of far
more individuals who are much worse off. Imagine there is one child who will live just
below the sufficiency threshold without asylum, and who will live an incredibly happy
life if given asylum, gaining welfare far above the sufficiency threshold. In contrast,
three other refugees suffering from Ewing Sarcoma will die shortly without asylum,
and live an insufficiently decent life with asylum, but still much better lives than with-
out asylum. It seems wrong to prioritise the one over the three. The fact that the one
refugee will live an incredibly happy life is important, but the extra QALYs she gains
above the sufficiency threshold seem less important than the extra QALYs the other
three gain up until the sufficiency threshold.19
This seems like a problem even if aggregate benefits come at the expense not of
helping more refugees, but of helping a much worse-off refugee. For example, con-
sider the following two South Sudanese refugees who I interviewed in Kenya. Gatbeel
managed to obtain employment in Nairobi, enabling him to access shelter and enough
food to be relatively healthy: he eats one or two meals a day consisting of mostly rice,
sometimes avocado, and less frequently meat, but has insufficient nutrients according
to World Health Organisation standards, and so he is just below the sufficiency thresh-
old.20 Compare him to Nyaluok, forced to remain in Dadaab refugee camp with even
less food and lacking treatment for a life-threatening respiratory disease.21 Both are
seeking transport to Uganda, where Gatbeel will have full rights and Nyaluok will not:
she will lack enough nutrients according to World Health Organisation standards, but
she will still obtain treatment and more food. In this example, resettling Gatbeel will
help him obtain a sufficiently decent life in Uganda, and resettling Nyaluok will not,
but Nyaluok is worse off without resettlement. To determine who should be selected,
it would seem wrong to resettle Gatbeel. Though he will gain more rights and welfare
through asylum than Nyaluok, the rights and welfare Nyaluok gains seem more valu-
able, given how badly off she is.
In such cases, we could abandon aggregate benefits entirely and institute a lottery,
with the winner resettled before the loser. But if we think that Nyaluok should be
resettled first, because of how badly off she is, then something wrong has occurred if
she loses the lottery and is not resettled. If we think that the three refugees with Ewing
Sarcoma should be resettled first, because the benefits they gain farther from the suffi-
ciency threshold are worth more, a lottery will not capture the value of these benefits.
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Prioritarianism
Here is a selection method that captures the value of these benefits Liam Shields pre-
sents a sufficientarian version of prioritarianism. Prioritarianism holds that the better
off someone is, the less weight we should give to each benefit obtained. Shield’s suffi-
cientarianism holds that the weight decreases at a greater rate after a sufficiency
threshold.22 He calls this a type of ‘nonuniform weighted prioritarianism’.
For an example of such nonuniform prioritarianism applied to refugees, imagine
one healthy child will:
(a) have a sufficiently decent life only if accessing another 40 QALYs,
(b) will access another 39 QALYs without asylum, and
(c) will access another 70 QALYs with asylum, thus gaining 70  39 = 31 QALYs
compared to no asylum.
Each of the 31 QALY she gains with asylum becomes increasingly less important, with
the first of the 31 QALYs having the most weight, the second of the 31 QALYs having
less weight, and so forth. Moreover, the weight decreases to a greater degree after the
first QALY, given that the first QALY raises her QALY number from 39 to 40, and is
thus the only QALY below the sufficiency threshold of 40. In contrast, imagine that
three refugees suffering from Ewin Sarcoma will live another 3 QALYs each without
asylum, or 9 QALYs combined, and live 13 QALYs each with asylum, or 39 com-
bined, gaining 39  9 = 30 QALYs combined. All of the 30 QALYs they gain are
below the sufficiency threshold, and each has increasingly more weight the farther
down from the threshold: the gain from 3 QALYs to 4 QALYs has the most weight,
followed by the gain from 4 QALYs to 5, and so forth. Given that all of their QALY
gains are below the sufficiency threshold, their QALY gains count for more than the
31 QALY gains for the healthy refugee.
The same nonuniform prioritarianism can be applied to the two refugees inter-
viewed in Kenya, Gatbeel and Nyaluok. If Gatbeel gains more benefits than Nyaluok
through asylum, but he is already better off than Nyaluok without asylum, his benefits
count for less than the benefits Nyaluok gains from asylum, with the benefits above
the sufficiency threshold counting for considerably less.
By giving greater weight to benefits below the sufficiency threshold, we recognise
that benefits matter more for the worst off, but that sometimes a large number of indi-
viduals gaining a sufficiently decent life outweighs the value of helping the worst off,
so long as the aggregate gains are great enough. If enough refugees will gain a signifi-
cantly improved life, then the total benefits they gain (even accounting for the lower
weight of each benefit) can counteract the benefits the worst off gain (even accounting
for the greater weight of each benefit).
Some might reject nonuniform prioritarianism in favor of uniform prioritarianism.
This view holds that the better off someone is, the less weight we should give to each
benefit they obtain, but the rate does not decrease at a faster rate after a sufficiency
threshold.23 For example, while the rights Gatbeel gained would be worth less than
those that Nyaluok gained, because he is better off, the rights gained above the suffi-
ciency threshold would count for more than under Shield’s nonuniform prioritarian-
ism, because the weight would not decrease at a faster rate above the sufficiency
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threshold. Uniform prioritarianism can still explain the intuition that Nyaluok should
be resettled first, assuming she is much worse off than Gatbeel, but it might lead to
Gatbeel being resettled first if Nyaluok is not much worse off than Gatbeel.
While I shall not attempt to determine whether nonuniform or uniform prioritarian-
ism is preferable, one’s broader view of refuge might impact one’s view.
The broader view of refuge I have been assuming is that states have special obliga-
tions towards outsiders who are particularly badly off. This implies a type of threshold
under which an individual is now in the category of “badly off.” Just like we ought to
rescue a drowning child if we can at below a given cost, because the child lacks a suffi-
cient right to life without being rescued, states ought to accept those who are starving,
persecuted, or suffering other grave harms, because such individuals lack a sufficiently
decent life without asylum. If refugees are special because they are below a sufficiency
threshold, then assistance under the sufficiency threshold seems especially important,
and this explains why gains below the sufficiency threshold increase at a faster rate
compared to gains above the sufficiency threshold.
While the above is consistent with how refuge is often viewed, some might accept
an alternative view: there are no individuals who are refugees, as separate from every-
one else, but only people who live on this earth, with some more badly off than others.
If states have obligations to invest some costs in helping outsiders, they ought to invest
these costs in a manner that balances the value of helping many people with the value
of helping the worse off. Uniform prioritarianism balances these two values, and no
sufficiency threshold is necessary.
While my initial intuition is that Shield’s nonuniform prioritarianism is more com-
pelling in the context of refugees – it does seem that states have weightier duties to
save individuals below some sufficiency threshold – I am not strongly committed to
this intuition. And it is not very important. What is most important is this: the value
of some form of prioritarianism explains why we should sometimes help those who are
worse off, but not always. And prioritarianism provides guidance for a range of diffi-
cult cases where states or organisations must decide between helping a large number
of refugees or a smaller number of worse-off refugees.
This general solution of prioritarianism is still abstract: it does not provide precise
guidance for all cases, as it does not establish weights of each added benefit. For
example, if a refugee has a small amount of food in a refugee camp, while another
has slightly more, it is not clear how we weigh the food gained for the first refugee
compared to the second. We can merely claim that each increase in food for the
first refugee is worth more than each increase for the second. Without precise
weights, we must sometimes rely on intuitions; in other words, we must have a
sense of which refugees are sufficiently badly off that their gains offset the gains of
those who are better off. I believe we do have this sense for cases like that of Gat-
beel and Nyaluok.
For cases where it is less clear which refugees should be prioritised, we may ulti-
mately need to appeal to lotteries. While a lottery is problematic when it clearly con-
flicts with intuitions about refugees like Gatbeel and Nyaluok, it needn’t be
problematic when we are uncertain who should be prioritised, because we are uncer-
tain how much weight we place on each additional benefit.
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Discrimination
Prioritarianism has a drawback: it sometimes involves wrongful discrimination. Indeed,
all of the proposed selection methods except for lotteries have this drawback. I explain
why and then argue that this discrimination is justified if it increases the odds that vic-
tims of discrimination obtain asylum, and they consent as a result. I will then respond
to a potential objection.
Why Proposed Selection Methods Involve Wrongful Discrimination
Discrimination, as I define it here, occurs when an agent treats individuals differently
because of a particular characteristic they hold. Not all discrimination is wrong. It
needn’t be wrong to treat lower-income individuals differently by providing them
assistance before the wealthy. Discrimination is only wrong when certain facts obtain.
What these facts are is up for debate. Some claim discrimination is wrong when it
excludes members of a disadvantaged group. Others claim discrimination is wrong
when it further disadvantages members of an already-disadvantaged group. Still others
claim discrimination is wrong when it demeans members of a minority group. For
example, imagine a principal segregates Black and White children. Even if the princi-
pal lives in a society where Black children are not disadvantaged, and the segregation
does not disadvantage them further, she would still be demeaning Black students. This
is because segregation expresses racism, given its association with racism throughout
history.24
I shall avoid delving into the debate over when discrimination is wrong and simply
presume that discrimination is at least wrong when all three of the above characteris-
tics are present. If a school refused to admit children from an already-disadvantaged
ethnic minority, it would be engaging in wrongful discrimination, as it would be
excluding and disadvantaging an already-disadvantaged group, and demeaning them
in a manner similar to the principal above. I shall also presume that discrimination
can be wrong without racist or sexist intentions if it entails direct statistical discrimina-
tion. Such discrimination occurs when someone intentionally treats members of a
group differently because they are statistically more likely to have certain characteris-
tics.25 A landlord engages in such discrimination when refusing to accept tenants of
an already-disadvantaged group because they are statistically less likely to pay rent on
time. Even if the landlord acts based on economic interests alone, she acts wrongly
because she demeans members of this minority, excludes them from housing, and
places yet another disadvantage in their way.
Helping the worst off, increasing aggregate benefits, and promoting sufficiency and
priority can all entail direct statistical discrimination. Here is an example from medical
care. Until recently there was evidence that African-Americans benefited less on aver-
age from beta-blockers in reducing blood pressure compared to non-African-Ameri-
cans, though they still benefited to an extent.26 If beta-blockers are more effective at
treating non-African-American patients, then more patients might gain a sufficiently
decent life if all resources for beta-blockers were diverted towards non-African-Ameri-
cans, denying African-Americans this treatment. Such a policy might also increase
total QALYs and funds for the worst-off patients if the worst off happened to be non-
African-American. If enough of the worst off benefited, this could also comply with
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prioritarianism: if we weighted benefits amongst the worst off as greater than benefits
amongst the better off, the weighted benefits from discrimination could be greater
than the weighted benefits for nondiscrimination. This policy would nonetheless be
wrong, as it would exclude African-Americans from urgent health care, disadvantaging
them further, and demeaning them in the process: it can be demeaning to walk into a
clinic and be denied health care because of one’s ethnicity.
Public health-care systems don’t engage in direct statistical discrimination (as far as
I know), but refugee resettlement systems do. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Jor-
dan discriminate against single men of Middle Eastern descent in determining who is
resettled or granted asylum, claiming Middle Eastern men are more of a security risk,
and so providing them security clearance is more costly.27 Given the costs, states can
potentially grant asylum to more individuals with their budgets if they discriminate
against these men, increasing the number of refugees obtaining a sufficiently decent
life, and possibly helping more of the worst-off refugees obtain asylum. These states
nonetheless engage in wrongful direct statistical discrimination if Middle Eastern men
are already disadvantaged compared to men of other backgrounds, and if such selec-
tion procedures are demeaning; it can be demeaning to be denied safety because of
one’s ethnic background.28
Selecting based on who is worse off, and based on sufficiency or priority, could sim-
ilarly entail discrimination against certain religious groups. A given UNHCR officer
might know that if she only recommends non-Muslim refugees for resettlement to Slo-
vakia, Hungary, or India – countries that avoid accepting Muslim refugees29 – these
countries would accept more refugees than if forced to accept Muslim refugees. This
could lead to more refugees obtaining a sufficiently decent life through asylum, pro-
ducing aggregate benefits and potentially maximising benefits for the worst off. Such
discrimination would still be wrong.
A similar type of direct statistical discrimination is related to individuals with dis-
abilities. Many countries select who is resettled by considering who will best adapt,
and those with disabilities are sometimes considered less likely to adapt.30 Such poli-
cies may increase QALYs if those with disabilities gain a lower quality of life from asy-
lum due to hardships in host countries that nondisabled individuals would not face.31
Even if greater weight were given for benefits gained for those with disabilities, on the
grounds that those with disabilities may be worse off without asylum compared to
others, the total weighted benefits they gained might still be lower than if nondisabled
refugees were resettled at a greater rate. They would therefore not be selected for asy-
lum, and such discrimination would seem wrong.
Importantly, voters may think that discrimination against those with disabilities will
increase the state’s overall budget because those without disabilities will pay more in
taxes. Whether or not this is true, voters may think the extra budget from accepting
disproportionately more nondisabled refugees will create costlier duties to accept more
refugees. If these voters do then accept more refugees, and this leads to a major
increase in benefits for the worst off, such discrimination may promote sufficiency and
priority. It would still seem wrong.
If such discrimination is wrong, this still raises a question of whether the wrongness
of discrimination is enough to deem it all things considered unjustified.32 For, we
might think that sometimes the benefits of helping the worst-off justify the wrongness
of discrimination.This is a possibility I shall now consider.
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A Proposition
When faced with scenarios described in the last subsection, we ought to adopt this
rule of thumb: the more victims of discrimination increase their chances of gaining
asylum as a result of discrimination, and the more they consent to discrimination as a
result, the stronger the reason to implement the discrimination.
For example, imagine:
(a) a state discriminates against refugees with a given disability, in that 1% of refugees
it accepts for asylum have this disability, while 2% of all refugees have this disabil-
ity;
(b) those without this disability are likely to pay more money in taxes, increasing the
state’s overall budget and the costs it has a duty to bear in accepting refugees; and
(c) as a result, the state grants asylum to more individuals, leading to an increase in
the absolute number of refugees with this disability gaining asylum, giving them a
greater chance of obtaining asylum than under a nondiscriminatory procedure.
This would be the case if the discriminating state accepted 100,000 refugees, including
1,000 with this disability, and had it not discriminated there would be less money
overall, giving the state a duty to accept only 40,000 refugees, 800 with this disability.
Though the 800 would be 2% of all those accepted, and thus not discriminatory, there
would be fewer with this disability granted asylum in absolute terms compared to
under the discriminatory policy. As a result, those with this disability would have a
lower overall chance of obtaining asylum compared to under the discriminatory policy.
The more refugees with this disability increase their chances of gaining asylum due to
discrimination, and the more they consent to discrimination as a result, the more rea-
son to adopt this policy. In some cases, this reason might be decisive; if the number
gaining asylum were high enough, and the number consenting were high enough, the
discrimination would be permissible.
The argument in support of this claim begins with a premise relating to consent.
Consent’s function is to give individuals autonomy over their lives by successfully dis-
solving the duty others owe to them. Doing so gives others permission they otherwise
would not have.33 For example, if Mary consents to Svetlana entering her home, Mary
dissolves Svetlana’s duty to not enter her home, giving Svetlana permission to enter
her home. To give consent that successfully dissolves another’s duty, one needn’t nec-
essarily be consenting voluntarily; it is enough that one has as much autonomy as the
agent obtaining consent has a duty to provide.
For example, imagine Svetlana needs protection from a gang, and so asks Mary to
give her refuge in her home until the gang stops pursuing her. Mary agrees on the
condition that Svetlana consent to paying a small percentage of her income towards
food – nothing very costly, just a small amount to cover Svetlana’s costs which Mary
can’t afford herself. Svetlana is coerced into her decision by the gang, and she may
even face coercion from Mary, in that Mary will force her to leave if she doesn’t pay a
small amount towards food. Though she is coerced, she is provided as much auton-
omy as Mary has a duty to provide her: though Mary doesn’t give refuge for free or
the option of being free from the gang’s pursuit, these are options which are
supererogatory or impossible for Mary to provide. If the remaining options – refuge at
a low price or no refuge at all – are all those Mary has a duty to provide, and if
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Svetlana chooses the first option, it seems she is treated permissibly. If she is treated
permissibly by utilising her autonomy to consent to Mary’s arrangement, she is fulfill-
ing the function of consent, and her consent is valid.
When a government selects refugees for asylum, it has a duty towards particular
refugees to refrain from discrimination. These refugees can dissolve the government’s
duty to not engage in discrimination – they can give the government permission to
engage in discrimination – if they have as much autonomy as the government has a
duty to ensure. They have such autonomy if the government provides them all options
it has a duty to provide. This might be the case if the government provides adequate
conditions in refugee camps and invests in obligatory costs for resettling refugees. If
the government (a) provides all such options, and (b) in doing so provides refugees as
much autonomy over their lives as it has a duty to provide, and (c) refugees wish to
use this autonomy to accept a discriminatory policy, it seems the government acts per-
missibly in respecting their choices.
In reality, it is rare for a government to provide refugees the autonomy it has a duty
to provide. Governments often refuse to invest all obligatory costs in sending aid
abroad and accepting refugees for resettlement. In such cases, the government denies
refugees options it ought not deny. For example, if it refuses to invest all obligatory
costs in supporting refugees in camps, it denies refugees the option to access sufficient
food in camps, and if it refuses to invest all obligatory costs in resettling refugees, it
denies refugees the option to be resettled. Such a government acts wrongly in institut-
ing a discriminatory policy; though refugees have greater autonomy in being able to
choose the discriminatory policy than not, their autonomy is unfairly constrained by a
government, and so they have not truly given consent. It would be comparable to a
thief putting a gun to a victim’s head, telling her she can give her money or her life:
the thief enhances the victim’s autonomy by giving her the option of giving up her
money rather than only the option of death, but he has not obtained consent to take
her money, because he impermissibly denies her the option of neither giving money
nor dying.
Even when the government fails to obtain refugees’ consent to discriminate, it might
still be better for the government to institute a discriminatory policy than not, if this is
what refugees desire. While the government acts wrongly in denying refugees various
options and instituting discrimination, this may be better than denying refugees vari-
ous options and not providing the option of discrimination which increases their
chance of asylum. To see why, return to the thief: it is better for a thief to give a vic-
tim the option of giving up her money and living, rather than only the option of keep-
ing her money and dying. He acts impermissibly either way, but giving one extra
impermissible option seems better for the victim than not giving options at all.
It is unlikely that all refugees who are discriminated against will consent to such dis-
crimination, even if many will. Moreover, there will be great variation in benefits.
Sometimes discrimination will significantly increase the number of refugees gaining
asylum and other times it won’t. For this reason, we ought to make a relative claim: of
those refugees who would be discriminated against under a given policy, the more
who consent and increase their chances of obtaining asylum under this policy, the
more reason governments or organisations (such as UNHCR) have to institute this
policy.
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This raises a question of how, in practice, governments or organisations would
obtain consent from these refugees. I lack the room to fully explore this question, but
it could entail independent monitors asking refugees in camps, rural settlements, and
urban centres if they would support a discriminatory policy. Such monitors would
need to tell refugees what the chances of resettlement would be under discriminatory
and nondiscriminatory policies. A related method would be to distribute a mobile-
based survey providing refugees information on the odds of obtaining asylum with the
prediction of chances made transparent. In other words, there would need to be both
a reliable method of gauging refugees’ opinions and reliable evidence to disclose to
refugees about the ways discrimination impacts their chances of obtaining asylum. For
now, such information is lacking, as is a method of obtaining refugees’ consent; but if
such mechanisms were ever available, they may be ethical methods of determining
whether discriminatory selections ought to be implemented.
An Objection
In another article in this issue, Kieran Oberman argues that some types of discrimi-
nation are always prohibited in virtue of discrimination alone. If a state were to
select able-bodied refugees more likely to contribute to the economy, increasing the
state’s overall revenue, this would be prohibited even if the extra revenue lead to
more refugees obtaining asylum. He provides a compelling analogy to support this
claim: imagine a hospital provided emergency care disproportionality to higher earn-
ers who would pay more taxes later if treated, contributing to health care overall.
This would seem to express disdain for lower earners, claiming they are less deserv-
ing of treatment on account of the lower salary they earned. Even if the government
insisted this was not its intention, its actions could be interpreted in a way that was
different than intended. Members of the general public, who already presume that
low earners are less deserving, might presume that low earners are similarly denied
health care because they are less deserving. If refugees were denied asylum based on
their low likelihood of contributing to the economy, the public might similarly pre-
sume that such refugees were less deserving.34 If so, then such discrimination would
be wrong.
One response to the above argument concerns the description of the hospital.
There is good reason to suppose that the hospital is not expressing disdain, at least if
diverting all extra funds towards health care for low earners. Were it to divert all
funds it gained to low earners, it would be expressing the following message: ‘You
are deserving of health care as much as high earners, and so we are disproportionality
treating high earners so that you can better access health care’. Versions of such rea-
soning may exist in the United Kingdom, where patients in public hospitals obtain
quicker treatment if they pay for private care within these hospitals, with profits con-
tributing towards the National Health Services overall, in theory helping low-income
patients obtain treatment. If the low-income patients consent to this arrangement and
the arrangement is implemented solely for their benefit, such a policy would be
expressing that low-income individuals have a special right to health care.35 The same
holds true with refugees. If some refugees are discriminated against but consent, and
the discrimination is implemented solely for their benefit, the discrimination needn’t
be disdainful.
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Of course, discrimination can still be disdainful if premised on false information.
Sometimes voters falsely assume that underrepresenting certain groups increases the
state’s overall budget to help refugees. For example, if voters assume that those with a
given disability are less productive, but they are not, then voters are expressing offen-
sive attitudes towards those with disabilities. If policymakers or UNHCR resettle dis-
proportionately fewer disabled refugees in response to voters’ attitudes, policymakers
and UNHCR may be expressing the same offensive attitude as well, even if not inten-
tionally.
While such discrimination may be wrong in one way, it might still be all things con-
sidered permissible. It is permissible if the agents selecting refugees only have access
to a discriminatory procedure that increases refugees’ odds of gaining asylum, or a
nondiscriminatory procedure that does not. These agents would be expressing a cer-
tain respect for refugees in letting them decide which procedure is implemented. In
contrast, if they insisted on nondiscrimination, they would imply the following mes-
sage: ‘We will deny you the option of choosing how we select refugees to ensure you
are not wronged’. There is a certain paternalism implied in this expression, such that
consensual discrimination may be better.
The above claim is consistent with policymakers trying to counter biases which lead
to voters accepting more refugees when certain groups are underrepresented: it would
be better if voters were less biased against those with disabilities, those of different reli-
gions, and so forth. It remains the case that, until such biases are undermined, there
will be scenarios where voters only agree to accept more refugees if some refugees are
underrepresented. When this occurs, those who are underrepresented ought to have a
say in whether this discrimination occurs.36
This raises the question of whether nonrefugees who are underrepresented ought to
have a say as well. Nonrefugees from a given demographic might be demeaned by a
policy discriminating against refugees from this demographic. For example, non-
refugees who are disabled may be insulted by discrimination against disabled refugees,
feeling it reinforces antidisability sentiments. Nonrefugees who are Muslim may be
insulted by discrimination against Muslim refugees, feeling it reinforces Islamophobia.
I lack the space to fully address this question, but it seems the consent of refugees has
special weight compared to the consent of nonrefugees. Refugees are those who can-
not access a sufficiently decent life if denied asylum. Assuming this is a greater harm
than the harms nonrefugees face from discrimination, the consent of refugees may be
enough to justify this discrimination.37
Summary
This article began with a question: if there is a limit to obligatory costs states must
bear in accepting refugees, and states cannot accept all refugees with these costs, it is
not clear how they should select the refugees they accept. I argued that refugees
should be selected in a manner that helps those who are particularly badly off and in a
manner that maximises the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life via
asylum. When these two goals are incompatible, refugees should be selected based on
aggregate benefits, with greater weight given to benefits farther from the sufficiency
threshold. An exception should only be made when this entails wrongful
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discrimination, in which case the discrimination is only justified if it increases the odds
that victims of discrimination obtain asylum, and they consent to such discrimination
as a result.
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